Among the celebrated aircraft flown by the Allies during World War II, none stirred as much controversy as the Martin B-26 Marauder. This twin-engine, cigar-shaped medium bomber elicited both fervent admiration and vehement disdain. The Air Transport Command’s Ferrying Division crews, tasked with delivering the Marauders to combat units, fell into the latter category, resenting the aircraft. Conversely, figures like Lt. Gen. James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle, who made use of a B-26 as his personal aircraft, and the majority of pilots and crew who flew it in combat, held it in high regard. Despite facing attempts to halt its production on three occasions, supporters of the B-26, notably Vincent “Squeek” Burnett, a former airshow pilot from Lynchburg, Va., managed to secure its continuation.
Despite its initial notoriety due to numerous training accidents resulting in the loss of many crew members, the Martin B-26 emerged from the war with the lowest combat loss ratio among American bombers.
The genesis of the B-26 stemmed from a 1939 Army Air Corps mandate for a twin-engine, high-speed medium bomber. The Glenn L. Martin Company answered with a design crafted by Peyton Magruder, a precocious aeronautical engineer whose background included the U.S. Naval Academy and the University of Alabama.
Magruder, a mere 26 years old when he conceptualized the design, demonstrated foresight by incorporating features such as high wing loading to minimize drag and enhance cruise speeds. Martin’s submission, among four contenders, garnered the highest acclaim from the Army, earning the contract. However, the innovative design posed challenges, notably requiring faster than average takeoff and landing speeds, as well as a notably high “minimum control speed,” factors contributing to subsequent operational issues.
Nearly two years elapsed from the Army’s initial specifications to the maiden flight of the B-26. Nevertheless, production orders had already been issued. An accelerated manufacturing program facilitated the provision of sufficient twin-engine bombers to equip an entire group by December 1, 1941. The 22nd Bombardment Group (Medium) exemplified this efficiency by deploying to its designated combat theater shortly after the Pearl Harbor attacks, largely self-sufficient in terms of equipment and trained personnel.
The squadron’s aircraft were transported to Hickam Field, Hi., via ship, where they were then assembled and piloted across the South Pacific Route to Brisbane, Australia, with arrivals commencing in mid-March. Upon reaching Australia, the 22nd transitioned to the coastal settlement of Townsville, initiating combat operations against Japanese forces in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.
Simultaneously, the 38th Bombardment Group, partially equipped with B-26s, operated with two Marauder squadrons alongside two squadrons utilizing North American B-25 Mitchell medium bombers. While the ground units of the 38th relocated to Australia, the aircrews remained in the United States for training. Although the group’s two B-26 squadrons, the 69th and 70th, reached Hawaii, they never progressed to the Pacific Theater.
Upon commencing operations from Townsville, the 22nd adopted the operational procedures observed by bomber squadrons equipped with B-25s and Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses in the region. Departing from Townsville, they loaded ammunition and ordnance before flying north to Port Moresby in New Guinea. There, crews received mission briefings while aircraft were refueled, before launching attacks against Japanese targets. Post-mission, they returned to Moresby for rest before heading back to Townsville. Living conditions at Moresby, serving as a forward airfield during the summer of 1942, were rudimentary, with crews bedding down under their aircraft’s wings, protected by mosquito netting they had brought along.
For all bomber crews operating in the Southwest Pacific during this period, regardless of their aircraft, missions were typically modest in scale, often comprising just three aircraft and rarely exceeding a dozen in formation. Frequently flying without escort due to the scarcity of Allied fighters in the region, which were required to defend forward bases from Japanese attacks, the B-26s occasionally carried torpedoes for ship strikes. Marauder crews also engaged in “skip-bombing” alongside B-17, B-25, and Douglas A-20 Havoc crews, targeting Japanese vessels at low altitudes.
Distinguished by its top speed of 315 miles per hour, the B-26 endowed Marauder crews with an advantage over the slower B-17s. Featuring a dorsal turret, waist and tail guns, along with additional nose-mounted weaponry, the B-26 also incorporated fixed forward-firing guns in fuselage pods. Employing low-level attack tactics emblematic of the Fifth Air Force, to which they were assigned, the 22nd’s B-26 crews proved elusive targets from below. Over more than a year of combat, the 22nd suffered only 14 losses to enemy fighters, while their gunners claimed 94 Japanese aircraft.
Surprisingly, a significant number of airborne gunners within the Army Air Corps lacked any formal training in gunnery during the initial stages of the war. Pilots selected gunners from the ground crew ranks and swiftly enlisted them for flying duties. Among these recruits was John Foley, a youthful enlistee who had embarked for Australia as a private without prior technical instruction. Upon arrival in Townsville, Foley commenced his duties as an armorer, diligently maintaining and loading weaponry and ordnance onto a collective aircraft. Foley’s adeptness caught the eye of his pilot, who promptly enlisted him as a gunner for their crew.
Despite his absence of formal gunnery education, Foley exhibited a natural talent, and his tally of downed enemy aircraft steadily climbed. Consequently, he earned the moniker “Johnny Zero,” becoming the subject of a widely sung tune by the same name.
Meanwhile, although originally slated for deployment to Australia, the two B-26 squadrons belonging to the 38th Bombardment Group never reached their intended destination. Instead, upon receiving intelligence from Navy codebreakers regarding Japanese intentions to invade Midway Island, two Marauders from the 69th Bombardment Squadron and two aircraft from the 22nd Group stationed in Hawaii were redirected to Midway. These four B-26s had been retrofitted to accommodate torpedoes. Alongside a modest contingent of Navy torpedo bombers, the Marauders launched an assault on the approaching Japanese fleet from Midway. Despite valiant efforts, two of the B-26s were downed, and the torpedoes deployed by the remaining pair proved ineffective. Consequently, the 69th and 70th Squadrons were detached from the 38th Group, which primarily operated B-25s, and reassigned to the South Pacific, where they commenced operations from Fiji.
Elsewhere, two squadrons of B-26s found themselves stationed in the frigid expanse of the Arctic as part of the 28th Composite Group, a versatile combat unit bolstering the Eleventh Air Force’s capabilities in Alaska. The 77th Bombardment Squadron journeyed from Sacramento, California, in January 1942, as part of the Army Air Corps’ initiative to reinforce aerial defenses in the remote northern region.
Meanwhile, the 73rd Bombardment Squadron had been stationed in Alaska for almost a year, operating outdated Douglas B-18s. By March 1942, the squadron traded in their antiquated aircraft for brand-new B-26s. Joining them was the 406th Squadron, also transitioning to Alaska. For a brief period, these three squadrons conducted search and attack missions across the Aleutian Islands, often employing torpedoes like their counterparts in the Southwest Pacific. However, their tenure with the B-26s proved fleeting, as the Army commenced replacing them with B-25s in September 1942.
Despite their effectiveness against Japanese forces, the B-26s’ days in the Pacific were numbered. Lieutenant General George C. Kenney, commander of the Southwest Pacific air forces, held the Marauder in high regard but deemed it unsuitable for his theater of operations. Preferring a streamlined command structure, Kenney advocated for a single type of fighter, light bomber, medium bomber, heavy bomber, and transport aircraft. His preferences leaned towards the Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighter, the A-20 and B-25 bombers, the Consolidated B-24 Liberator heavy bomber, and the Douglas C-47 transport.
Consequently, the B-26s found themselves sidelined. The 22nd Group phased out the B-26s in favor of B-25s, eventually transitioning into a heavy bomber unit equipped with B-24s. Although a few B-26s lingered on in missions with the 22nd until early 1944, they gradually faded from the theater entirely. Similarly, the former 38th Group squadrons in the South Pacific also shifted to B-25s.
While the B-26s in the Pacific maintained their combat prowess, discontent brewed among training facilities stateside regarding the aircraft’s reputation. Initially, murmurs circulated among ferry pilots tasked with transporting the planes from factories to bases. The primary issue lay in the high wing loading of early B-26 models, rendering them volatile, particularly in the event of engine failure if pilots failed to sustain optimal airspeed.
Engine malfunctions plagued B-26s frequently, particularly attributable to the unreliable Pratt and Whitney R2800 engines. Pilots had to uphold sufficient airspeed to prevent the aircraft from flipping and crashing post-engine failure. Tragically, numerous ferry crews succumbed to B-26 accidents, instigating widespread reluctance to fly the aircraft. Subsequent models, featuring expanded wing spans, bolstered the Marauder’s performance.
Enter Squeek Burnett, a seasoned air show pilot enlisted in the Ferrying Service post-Pearl Harbor. Assigned to ferry B-26s, Burnett perceived no inherent flaws in the aircraft. Upon learning of mounting pressure to terminate the B-26 contract due to escalating accidents, Burnett initiated independent trials. He conducted engine shutdowns, executed low passes with one engine offline, and maneuvered with the dead engine. Through his demonstrations, Burnett endeavored to prove that with proper training and diligent maintenance of airspeed, the B-26 could be safely operated.
Meanwhile, among fledgling Army pilots slated for B-26 combat deployment, the aircraft’s negative reputation burgeoned. Training accidents surged, prompting the formation of the Truman Committee to investigate. Lack of multi-engine experience among trainees, compounded by modifications to enhance combat readiness, exacerbated the situation. While seasoned pilots navigated these challenges adeptly, the influx of inexperienced aviators necessitated action.
The Truman Committee proposed removing B-26s from service due to the soaring accident rate. Martin sought aid from combat pilots in the Southwest Pacific, who staunchly defended the aircraft, salvaging it from obsolescence.
Upon returning to the US following the Tokyo raid, former racing pilot Jimmy Doolittle received the Medal of Honor and a promotion to brigadier general. Despite recommendations for key roles, such as Chief of Staff for Air in the Southwest Pacific, Doolittle faced rejection, with General Douglas MacArthur favoring George Kenney. Instead, Doolittle assumed command of the Twelfth Air Force in North Africa, which comprised units equipped with B-26s, including one earmarked as his personal aircraft.
Doolittle, who had prior experience with the B-26, contemplated its use during the Tokyo Raid but dismissed it due to the aircraft’s extended wingspan, posing challenges on carrier decks. General Henry H. Arnold tasked Doolittle with addressing B-26 issues, prompting Doolittle to enlist Squeek Burnett’s expertise by incorporating him into his staff.
As a consequence of frequent accidents, the B-26 acquired several disparaging monikers including “Widow Maker,” “Flying Prostitute,” and “Baltimore Whore.” The numerous crashes, particularly at McDill Field, Fla., inspired the morbid refrain “One a Day in Tampa Bay.” Similar accident rates plagued other B-26 training bases. Seeking to instill confidence in the aircraft, Doolittle embarked on a tour of bases to exhibit its capabilities. Despite the assumption by many that Doolittle himself piloted these demonstrations, it was actually Captain Vincent “Squeek” Burnett who deftly maneuvered the aircraft.
In November 1942, the 319th Bombardment Group, the first of three Twelfth Air Force B-26 groups, commenced operations in North Africa. This marked a shift in the B-26 crews’ role to a new form of warfare, operating more tactically to support ground forces compared to the strategic approach of the 22nd Bomb Group in the Pacific.
Joining the 319th Group in Africa were the 320th and 17th Bombardment Groups. The 17th Group underwent a unique transition, having initially operated B-25s before being re-equipped with B-26s following losses in Doolittle’s Tokyo mission. Experienced personnel from the 17th formed the nucleus for the other B-26 groups.
During their initial operations in North Africa, the B-26 groups conducted low-altitude bombing and strafing attacks similar to their Pacific counterparts. However, after General Doolittle issued orders, the B-26s transitioned to medium-level bombing, resembling the heavy bombing tactics of the Twelfth Air Force’s B-17s.
Under the new directives, the B-26 crews adopted shotgun tactics, dispersing bombs over a wider area instead of precision bombing at low altitude. Only the lead aircraft in each formation utilized a Norden bombsight, while others toggled their bombs upon seeing their leader’s release.
Taking advantage of his authority, Doolittle established a personal courier service overseen by Squeek Burnett, facilitating communication between England and Washington via B-26 flights. Doolittle occasionally joined B-26 missions in his private aircraft.
As the ground war in North Africa waned, B-26 operations shifted to targets along the Mediterranean coast, supporting Allied plans to invade Sicily. Following the Sicily landings, B-26s aided ground forces by bombing German strongholds, contributing to the gradual Allied advance northward through Italy.
The Mediterranean Air Force B-26s played a pivotal role in the contentious events surrounding the stalled Allied advance at Monte Cassino, where the ancient Benedictine abbey loomed atop the eponymous mountain, serving as a formidable German stronghold.
Certain senior Allied commanders harbored suspicions that the Germans were utilizing the abbey as an observation post. This conjecture led to a significant event on February 15, 1944, when multiple squadrons comprising 142 B-17s and 112 B-25s and B-26s conducted a bombing raid on the venerable monastery. The relentless bombardment left the abbey in ruins. Subsequently, the Germans, who had hitherto shown deference to the site’s religious sanctity, seized the wreckage and fortified it as a stronghold amidst the ongoing tumult of battle in the surrounding city.
Following weeks of unsuccessful attempts to seize control of the town, General Mark Clark, commanding the Allied forces in Italy, opted for drastic measures. On the morning of March 15, 1944, a fleet of B-25s initiated a sustained assault that lasted until midday. In a concerted effort, 275 B-17s and B-24s, alongside approximately 200 B-25s and B-26s, unleashed over 1,000 tons of 1,000-pound bombs upon the city. Notably, the B-26 squadrons distinguished themselves, with over 90 percent of their bombs hitting the intended targets. The once-thriving town was reduced to rubble. Despite the effective air campaign, ground warfare persisted for several more weeks.
In early 1943, the 322nd Bombardment Group relocated to England, joining the ranks of the Eighth Air Force. General Ira Eaker, commander of the Eighth Air Force, sought innovative strategies to integrate the newly arrived B-26s into the strategic bombing offensive. Inspired by the success of low-altitude assaults in the Pacific theater, the air staff encouraged Eaker to employ the B-26s in similar operations against German coastal targets in Europe.
However, the realities of European warfare posed distinct challenges. With German forces entrenched in France and the Low Countries for over two years, formidable defenses had been erected against aerial assaults during the protracted conflict. On May 14, the 322nd embarked on its inaugural mission, executing a low-level strike with 12 B-26s targeting a power station at Ijmuiden in Holland.
Fortune smiled upon the novice squadron, as casualties remained minimal. Despite encountering intense antiaircraft fire, the Marauders successfully released their payload. Yet, one aircraft aborted the mission after sustaining cannon fire, while two others sustained significant damage. Although two damaged planes safely returned to England, the third experienced landing gear malfunctions, leading the pilot to order an emergency bailout, resulting in the tragic loss of his life.
Just three days later, on May 17, the 322nd launched another sortie against the same target. However, luck eluded them this time. Of the 11 aircraft deployed, all but one were lost. Five fell victim to flak, while two collided mid-air. Intercepted by German fighters upon exiting the target area, none of the Marauders survived the ensuing aerial engagement. The introduction of the B-26 into Western European combat proved disastrous.
Following the debacle of May 17, the 322nd ceased combat operations while new tactics were devised. Subsequent missions would be conducted at higher altitudes to evade deadly ground fire, and no flights would venture beyond the reach of fighter escort. In mid-July, the B-26s resumed operations with a raid on Abbeville, adopting medium-altitude bombing runs above 10,000 feet.
The revised approach yielded positive results. Over the ensuing fortnight, the B-26s executed 11 missions, suffering only two losses. Although the Eighth Air Force leadership anticipated that the inclusion of medium bombers would compel the Germans to divert resources from defending against heavy bombers, the reality differed. German attention remained fixed on B-17 formations, largely disregarding the threat posed by the B-26s. Consequently, the primary peril to the Marauders became ground-based flak.
Following the catastrophe at Ijmuiden, the utilization of B-26s shifted to serving solely as medium-range bombers, directing their focus towards airfields in France and the occupied territories. However, these endeavors proved largely fruitless. The majority of German fighters had either withdrawn to defend the Nazi heartland or were deployed to the Eastern Front. Eaker’s anticipation that B-26 formations would divert fighters away from heavy bombers remained unfulfilled. Despite causing temporary disruptions by targeting German airfields, the damage inflicted could be swiftly repaired, rendering the attacks primarily ineffective.
In a bid to provide escorts, the Eighth Air Force devised a plan to incorporate B-26s alongside B-17s. Previous attempts with the YB-40 conversion of B-17s into heavily armed escort gunships had yielded unsatisfactory results. Similarly, the B-26 escort plan proved futile. The aircraft’s velocity outpaced that of the B-17s, and its range was inadequate to accompany the heavy bombers into high-risk zones. Moreover, despite their speed, the B-26s remained susceptible to fighter interceptions, mirroring the vulnerabilities of the B-17s.
By the conclusion of August, the 322nd had been reinforced by three additional B-26 groups: the 323rd, 386th, and 387th. Although all four groups fell under the Eighth Bomber Command, a reorganization was underway. During the Casablanca Conference in early 1943, the Allies formulated plans for the Combined Bomber Offensive, an extensive strategic bombing campaign targeting German and Italian territories.
As Allied aerial operations commenced on the African continent, the Ninth Air Force was established to oversee operations from Palestine. For over a year, heavy bombers of the Ninth Air Force conducted missions against German and Italian targets across the Mediterranean, including the notable low-altitude assault on the Ploesti oil fields. In October 1943, the Ninth Air Force was disbanded, and its group headquarters and numerical designations were relocated to England, where they were reassigned to the emerging tactical air force tasked with supporting the Normandy invasion.
The heavy bombers formerly under the Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces were to be reassigned to the newly established Fifteenth Air Force, which would operate from bases in Italy as part of an extensive heavy bombing campaign against Germany.
In England, the Eighth Air Force headquarters was upgraded to the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, assuming command over a revamped Eighth Air Force comprising the former VIII Bomber Command and the new Fifteenth Air Force. Doolittle was dispatched to England to take charge of the restructured Eighth. The medium bomber groups previously associated with the Eighth were transferred to the new Ninth Air Force, alongside light bomber groups operating A-20s and certain fighter groups designated for ground attack roles. The Twelfth Air Force transitioned into a tactical air force to support ground operations in the Mediterranean.
Upon the relocation of the Ninth Air Force headquarters to England in the autumn of 1943, the IX Bomber Command inherited the 3rd Bomb Wing, comprising four B-26 groups from the Ninth Air Force. Colonel Samuel E. Anderson assumed command of the IX Bomber Command, altering its mission from heavy to medium bomber operations. The B-26s of the 322nd, 323rd, 386th, and 387th bombardment groups were to be joined by four additional B-26 groups and three light bomber groups equipped with A-20s. Several squadrons of P-47 and P-51 fighter-bombers constituted the remaining striking power of the Ninth, while the IX Troop Carrier Command provided support for Allied airborne operations.
In Operation Crossbow, the Ninth Air Force B-26s played a marginal role in the Allied air campaign against suspected German V-weapon launch sites along the French coast. In the spring of 1943, a Royal Air Force photo-interpreter detected the initial signs of German missiles, although it would be nearly eighteen months before the first V-bombs struck English soil.
In December 1943, the Allies initiated Crossbow, a bombing offensive aimed at thwarting German plans to deploy their new weapons. While the majority of the campaign was executed by heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force, the Ninth Air Force B-26 groups were credited with 26 “Category A Damage” airstrikes against V-1 launch sites by May 1944, marking the cessation of the attacks.
In the final week of April 1944, the IX Bomber Command was allocated its tasks for the imminent Normandy invasion. Leading up to the invasion, the crews of Ninth Air Force’s B-26 and A-20 aircraft underwent rigorous training while executing preliminary strikes on railroad marshaling yards, airfields, and coastal batteries, alongside sustained assaults on robot-bomb targets whenever feasible.
Continuing into the preparatory phase of the invasion, the A-20s and B-26s directed their efforts towards all airfields within a 130-mile radius of the strategically vital French village of Caen, in addition to targeted radar stations, aiming to render them ineffective. As per the D-day strategy, all eleven groups were to engage six German heavy artillery batteries stationed in the English Channel, within range of the invasion fleet. Meanwhile, five minutes prior to the landings, the B-26s were tasked with bombing seven heavily fortified positions located inland from Utah Beach.
Ahead of the invasion, the B-26 units closely collaborated with IX Fighter Command’s fighter-bombers. One notable mission involved 163 B-26s striking railroad yards at Hasselt, Belgium, dropping 263 tons of bombs from medium altitudes, supplemented by 101 dive-bombing P-47s unleashing 120 250-pound bombs, resulting in substantial damage to the target.
The approach to attacks on marshaling yards shifted, with four or five groups of 34 aircraft each concentrating on a single rail center, abandoning the previously employed shotgun tactics. General Lewis Brereton, commander of Ninth Air Force, advocated for the division of B-26 formations into smaller sections of four to six aircraft, enabling concentrated bomb delivery and minimizing civilian risk. Other missions prioritized the destruction of road and railroad bridges, particularly after May 24, when restrictions on targeting bridges over the Seine River were lifted.
In anticipation of the invasion, all tactical aircraft, including B-26s, underwent the application of invasion markings—distinctive alternating white and black stripes on the wings and fuselage—to facilitate easy identification by ground forces. While the invasion plans stipulated medium bombers to maintain medium altitudes, adverse weather conditions on June 6, 1944, led to a 3,000-foot overcast above the beaches, prompting consideration of altering plans.
Given that B-17s and B-24s were equipped for blind bombing through cloud cover, contemplation arose regarding the cancellation of the medium mission and redirecting the heavy bombers from their intended targets at Caen. General Anderson secured approval for his medium bombers to descend below the overcast layer to fulfill their assigned missions.
While all attention had been directed towards the invasion’s execution, the commencement of the D-day landings marked merely the inception of duties for the tactical aircraft under the command of the Ninth Air Force. Following the troops’ successful landing, their sustained presence ashore became imperative for operational effectiveness, prompting the strategic deployment of tactical air power to offer multifaceted support. Tasked with neutralizing gun batteries and fortified positions, the B-26s spearheaded assaults to facilitate the Allied forces’ breakout from the beachheads and subsequent advancement inland.
By early August, the long-awaited breakthrough materialized, as ground forces penetrated deeper into France, seizing control of Luftwaffe airfields along the way. Capitalizing on these captured assets, fighter-bomber groups of the Ninth Air Force swiftly relocated across the English Channel, establishing operational bases on French soil. Embracing a doctrine advocating for proximity to the front lines, tactical aircraft swiftly transitioned to operating from forward airfields, with the final contingents of fighter-bombers completing their relocation by mid-August. By month’s end, four B-26 groups were actively conducting sorties from French airfields.
Meanwhile, as efforts to secure the Normandy beachhead persisted, B-26s of the Twelfth Air Force undertook preparatory missions to soften enemy defenses ahead of the impending invasion of Southern France, scheduled for August 15. Tasked with targeting enemy airfields in the Po River Valley, the B-26s executed precision strikes, culminating in a decisive assault on submarine pens at Toulon on the eve of the invasion. Faced with overwhelming Allied strength, German forces strategically retreated northward, facilitating the relatively unimpeded landings.
Encountering minimal resistance from the Luftwaffe and encountering scant opposition from German ground forces in Southern France, Allied control over the region swiftly solidified in the weeks following the landings. As operational bases became available, B-26 units of the Twelfth Air Force progressively relocated to France, consolidating efforts to support the Allied advance into German territory.
Despite typically enjoying fighter escorts and encountering limited German aerial opposition, the Marauders faced a sudden escalation in hostilities on December 23 during the Battle of the Bulge. In a devastating turn of events, a substantial contingent of German fighters launched a coordinated assault on B-26 formations engaged in critical missions targeting bridges and communication hubs. The ensuing skirmish marked the darkest chapter in Marauder history, with 35 aircraft lost and 182 others sustaining varying degrees of battle damage.
Initial reports suggested that over 200 Marauders were unaccounted for, although the majority were later found. The crews of the B-26s experienced firsthand the intense combat that heavy bomber crews had endured for over two years. The 391st Bomb Group suffered the most significant losses, with 16 planes lost in the morning raid, yet still managed to launch a follow-up attack in the afternoon. Straying from their designated escort, the group fell prey to German fighters. Despite this, the 391st was honored with a Presidential Unit Citation for their actions that day. Regrettably, a squadron of B-26s mistakenly bombed a railroad yard under Allied control, filled with crucial fuel destined for the U.S. Third Army.
Fortunately, the heavy losses incurred on December 23 marked a final, desperate effort by the Luftwaffe. Despite deploying new, devastating weapons such as the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighters, the advancing Soviets had seized control of Balkan oil fields, cutting off Germany’s main crude oil supply, while Allied bombers had severely damaged the synthetic oil industry.
Though possessing formidable fighters, the Germans lacked the numbers to alter the inevitable course of events. Fuel shortages plagued the Luftwaffe, resulting in significant losses among its pilots.
Over the ensuing four months, Allied forces penetrated deeper into Germany, fulfilling the B-26s’ mission.
