Throughout the first year of American involvement in World War II, the Curtiss P-40 Warhawk (referred to as the Kittyhawk or Tomahawk by the British) symbolized the United States Army Air Corps’ determination to confront Japanese aggression. This recognition stemmed from the notable achievements of the American Volunteer Group during the initial six months of the conflict, followed by the successes of the 23rd Fighter Group in China. Despite lacking the performance capabilities of aircraft like the twin-engine Lockheed P-38 Lightning and Republic’s radial engine P-47 Thunderbolt, the P-40, along with the Bell P-39 Airacobra, constituted one of the primary types of pursuit planes available in significant numbers at the war’s outset, and the only ones readily deployable in the Pacific theater.
In the period leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, numerous squadrons of P-40s were deployed to the Philippines as part of the United States’ efforts to bolster its military presence there in response to Japanese aggression in Asia. Additionally, in mid-1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the shipment of sufficient P-40s to outfit four squadrons in China. The resilience exhibited by American and Australian pilots flying P-39s and P-40s against formidable odds exemplified Allied determination during the early, challenging days of the war in the China-Burma-India Theater.
Developed by the Curtiss Aircraft Company as part of its Hawk line of fighters, which traced its origins back to retractable-gear biplane pursuit aircraft of the 1930s, the P-40 was an adaptation of the P-36 monoplane, featuring the R-1830 radial engine. By incorporating the Allison V-1710 liquid-cooled in-line engine into the P-36 fuselage, Curtiss significantly enhanced the aircraft’s performance by reducing drag.
Initially, the P-40 was armed with only two machine guns mounted on top of the nose, but subsequent versions featured increased armament, with most combat models carrying six .50-caliber machine guns. Additionally, the inclusion of hard points under the wings enabled the attachment of bombs and rockets, transforming the Warhawk into a formidable ground attack aircraft.
Both the P-40 and the smaller P-39 were developed in line with the U.S. military policy of the 1930s, which emphasized coastal defense. Consequently, their primary purpose was to provide support for ground troops. At that time, the potential threat of enemy aircraft interception was not deemed significant, as the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were perceived to offer protection against potential attacks from Europe or Asia. During the 1930s, there were no aircraft capable of conducting transoceanic attacks on the United States. Despite the growing importance of naval aviation, neither Germany nor Japan was believed to have the capability to launch carrier-borne attacks on the United States or Hawaii.
The main threat that the Army aimed to counter was an amphibious assault from the sea, leading to the design of both fighters with this scenario in mind. It was only with the outbreak of war in Europe and the prominence of bombers as a key weapon that aerial interception became a critical mission for the Air Corps.
Given the nature of low altitude operations required for ground support, aircraft were exposed to various threats, ranging from small arms to heavy antiaircraft fire. As a result, both the P-39 and P-40 were designed to withstand ground fire and remain operational. While these characteristics were advantageous in ground attack roles, both aircraft were significantly limited as interceptors due to their lack of high-altitude performance capabilities.
Despite the P-40 being less maneuverable compared to the P-39, which was acknowledged for its agility and effectiveness against Japanese fighters at lower altitudes, both aircraft were praised for their durability and resilience by those who flew them in combat in the Pacific. General George C. Kenney praised both designs for their ability to endure combat, absorb gunfire, and return safely.
In the spring of 1941, the United States initiated a reinforcement of its presence in the Philippine Islands as part of the modifications to its Rainbow No. 5 war plan. Previous plans had entailed the withdrawal of U.S. forces to a line from Alaska to Hawaii, but the escalation of Japanese aggression in Asia led to revisions. Under the revised plan, the Philippines would serve as a strategic base for launching attacks on Japanese positions threatening the oil fields in the Netherlands East Indies. In the event of an invasion, defending U.S. and Filipino forces were directed to retreat to the Bataan Peninsula and await reinforcements from the United States.
The modernization of the Air Corps in the Philippines played a vital role in the defense of the islands. In May, the first P-40Bs arrived and were assigned to the 20th Pursuit Squadron, replacing older aircraft types. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron also received P-40s, while the 17th Pursuit Squadron continued to operate de Seversky P-35s temporarily. The Philippines Air Force received the outdated Boeing P-26s, previously used by U.S. Army Air Corps squadrons in the islands.
In August 1941, the three Army Air Corps fighter squadrons, the first in the Philippines, were consolidated into the 24th Pursuit Group. They were later joined by two squadrons of the 35th Pursuit Group, the 21st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, in November. However, the 35th Group headquarters remained at sea during the Japanese attack and never reached Manila; instead, it was redirected to Australia, where the 35th would be reestablished.
The two later squadrons were equipped with more advanced P-40Es, while the 34th Squadron’s aircraft were transferred to the 17th Pursuit Squadron, which in turn received the P-35s previously operated by the 34th. Additional P-40s were on their way to the islands by sea to replace the P-35s. By the end of November, the 20th Pursuit had received P-40Es. The Hawaiian Air Force stationed on Oahu also included several P-40 squadrons, with the 15th Pursuit Group at Wheeler Field and the 18th Pursuit at Hickam Field both equipped with P-40s. Additionally, other P-40 squadrons were deployed to Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone.
Fortunate circumstances led to the deployment of four squadrons of P-40s, piloted by experienced and well-trained American aviators, to China prior to the outbreak of war. Captain Claire Chennault had journeyed to China in 1937 following his retirement from the Army, assuming a civilian advisory role within Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Chinese government. At the time of his retirement, Chennault was not only one of the most seasoned and skilled fighter pilots in the Air Corps but also a distinguished tactician adept at leveraging the strengths of the aircraft at his disposal.
General Walter Short maintained the belief that sabotage posed the most significant threat to the Army fighters.
Over the following four years, Chennault gained firsthand experience of Japanese aggression and developed expertise in enemy tactics. Additionally, he formulated strategies to counter Japanese military maneuvers. Previous attempts involving mercenary pilots from Europe had yielded minimal results. By 1941, China remained vulnerable to Japanese air assaults, prompting the Chinese government to seek assistance from the United States. T.V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek’s brother-in-law, advocated on behalf of China in the United States, requesting American-built bombers and fighters, as well as skilled American pilots, to bolster the Chinese Air Force.
During a visit to the United States, Chennault persuaded President Roosevelt to authorize a clandestine military operation, later known as the American Volunteer Group (AVG), which involved recruiting experienced U.S. Army, Marine, and Navy fighter pilots for service in China. These pilots were officially discharged from their respective services and contracted with Chennault’s AVG as civilians, with the understanding that they could potentially return to their original service after fulfilling their obligations in China.
Although the members of the AVG did not view themselves as mercenaries, they essentially operated in that capacity. Part of the agreement included the provision of enough P-40s to equip four squadrons, initially sourced from a consignment intended for Sweden.
The devastating Japanese attack on Hickam Field on December 7, 1941, severely impacted the 18th Pursuit Group. General Walter Short, the senior Army officer in Hawaii, believed that sabotage posed the greatest threat to the Army fighters and ordered them to be parked closely together for better security. The U.S. military in Washington and Honolulu did not anticipate a significant aerial attack from carriers.
The surprise Japanese attack caught the U.S. military in Hawaii off guard, resulting in substantial damage to Hickam Field. Only two P-40s managed to take off, both being shot down promptly. Wheeler Field also came under Japanese assault, but a handful of P-40s and P-36s managed to become airborne. Despite the chaos, six squadron pilots from the 47th Pursuit Squadron stationed at Haleiwa airfield, including Lieutenants Harry M. Brown, Robert J. Rogers, Kenneth A. Taylor, John J. Webster, and George S. Welch, raced to their aircraft, took off, and engaged the Japanese attackers. Despite being outnumbered, they managed to inflict significant damage on the enemy, with Welch alone claiming four Japanese planes shot down.
The prevailing notion, often reinforced by many historians, that the Air Corps in the Philippines was caught off guard and severely debilitated on the war’s first day is more myth than reality. In actuality, both American and Filipino fighter squadrons had been on high alert for weeks, with fighters already conducting patrols over the Philippines before the first Japanese aircraft arrived. The pilots remained vigilant alongside their aircraft, even sleeping beside them.
Upon receiving word of the attack on Pearl Harbor, fighters were immediately scrambled into the air for combat air patrols. The 3rd Fighter Squadron at Iba made efforts to intercept a large Japanese formation detected by the Iba radar site during the early morning hours. However, despite radar confirmation of the P-40s engaging the formation, they were unable to locate the Japanese bombers in the darkness, leading to uncertainty about the identity of these unidentified aircraft.
Later in the day, fog over Formosa hindered the Japanese 11th Air Fleet bombers and fighters from taking off, although Japanese Army bombers remained active. Attacks on cities in Northern Luzon prompted P-40s from Nichols Field to hastily take off for interception. Furthermore, the Iba radar site detected another large Japanese formation over the China Sea, prompting the dispatch of the 3rd Pursuit for base defense. However, by the time the Japanese arrived in the Philippines, the P-40s were running low on fuel, with some flights preparing to land at Iba when Japanese fighters strafed the airfield.
The P-40 pilots retracted their landing gear and turned toward the Japanese, disrupting the strafing attack. Unfortunately, bombs dropped by high-altitude bombers inflicted significant damage on the base, including the destruction of the radar site. However, all the aircraft managed to take off and avoided being hit by the bombs. None of the P-40s were lost during the attack.
One pilot, who was in the landing pattern when the attack began, had no choice but to ditch his P-40 in the surf just off the small grass airfield. Several other P-40s were compelled to make emergency landings due to malfunctions in their new engines. These aircraft had recently arrived in the Philippines, and there wasn’t sufficient time to properly break in the engines before they were thrust into combat. The inability to adequately condition the engines on newly assembled P-40s would later prove to be a significant factor in the defeat of the Army Air Corps in the Philippines.
The Japanese encountered a stroke of luck at Clark Field. The 20th Pursuit Squadron had been dispatched north to search for the Japanese bombers spotted over Northern Luzon earlier that day. When their fuel levels became critical, they redirected to Clark. As the P-40s were refueled, they lined up in groups to take off again, but only one group of four aircraft, led by squadron commander Lieutenant Joe Moore, managed to become airborne before the attack began.
The Japanese bombers aimed their attack directly at the ramp where the P-40s were being serviced, leading to the destruction of the 14 remaining fighters. Moore and his wingmen immediately confronted the Japanese attackers. Lieutenant Randall Keator achieved the first hit, becoming the inaugural American fighter pilot in the Pacific Theater to shoot down a Japanese plane. Moore, too, downed two enemy fighters, while other P-40 pilots, including those from the 3rd Pursuit at Iba stationed near Clark, joined in the defense effort. Furthermore, P-36 pilots reported scoring multiple hits on Japanese aircraft.
The near destruction of the U.S. Army Air Corps in the Philippines on December 8 contributed to the enduring myth of Japanese aircraft superiority in the early stages of the war. Japanese fighters, being lighter than the American P-40s, had an advantage at higher altitudes. Nevertheless, the P-40s proved formidable at lower altitudes, where they could match their Japanese counterparts. When a P-40 pilot successfully hit a Japanese fighter, it frequently led to the downing of the enemy plane. Conversely, the robust P-40s could endure substantial damage and still stay airborne.
Despite the agility of the Japanese fighters, they were not invulnerable. With proper training and equipment, the U.S. air units in the Philippines could have posed a formidable challenge to the Japanese, making it difficult for them to gain control of the air.
Wagner, the first American ace of the war, promptly recognized the shortcomings of the Japanese fighters.
More P-40s were lost in the Philippines due to engine failures than enemy fire, with limited fuel capacity compounding the issue. Many pilots were compelled to bail out or perform emergency landings due to fuel exhaustion, especially during the intense dogfight on December 10 when Japanese raids targeted Manila.
Inexperience also led to numerous accidents during takeoff and landing, particularly among the young aviation cadets who lacked practical flying experience in high-performance fighters. Despite these challenges, some experienced fighter pilots achieved remarkable success against the Japanese, often facing overwhelming odds.
Despite the setbacks, there were instances of extraordinary heroism among P-40 pilots in the early weeks of the war. Following the December 10 battle, General Harold George opted to utilize P-40s primarily for ground attack missions due to the significant reduction in the Far East Air Forces fighter force.
Pilots like Boyd Wagner, Grant Mahony, and William Dyess demonstrated remarkable bravery. Mahony executed a daring attack on a Japanese radio station and airfield at Legaspi before being evacuated to Australia, where he took charge of training newly arrived pilots. Eventually, Mahony served in India and China before returning to the Philippines, where he tragically perished in combat while flying a P-38.
Wagner, an adept pilot and aeronautical engineer, swiftly identified the weaknesses of the Japanese fighters, earning him the distinction of being the first American ace of the war. After his evacuation to the Philippines, he assumed command of a P-39 squadron and relocated to Port Moresby in Papua, New Guinea, in mid-1942. Dyess, on the other hand, remained on Bataan and became a prisoner of war. He led a significant American air attack before the surrender of Bataan, directing a bombing raid on Japanese ships in Subic Bay alongside three other P-40 pilots.
Dyess fell into Japanese hands upon the surrender of Bataan and spent several months as a prisoner of war before successfully escaping and reaching Australia. Other pilots, like Lieutenant Russell Church, exhibited extraordinary courage, choosing to remain in their burning P-40s to strafe Japanese fighters parked at Vigan airfield instead of bailing out.
Incredibly, P-40s remained active in combat in the Philippines until the ultimate Japanese triumph at Mindanao. Some were transported from Bataan to Mindanao, and three were sent by ship to Cebu in the southern Philippines. After reassembly, they were flown to Mindanao just before the Japanese took control of Cebu. Among their final assignments was escorting American bombers from Darwin, Australia, in April for offensive strikes against Japanese installations at Davao and Cebu.
With Del Monte Field’s impending capture by the Japanese, efforts were made to evacuate as many pursuit pilots as possible to Australia to reinforce their comrades. They were intended to serve as the core of the Fifth Air Force fighter squadrons tasked with attaining air superiority in the Southwest Pacific.
On December 20, 1941, President Roosevelt made the decision to withdraw support from the Philippines, prompting the War Department to transfer the headquarters of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) to Australia. Upon their arrival, personnel discovered a disorganized force lacking in military discipline. Captain Paul I. Gunn, a former U.S. Navy enlisted aviator who had been living in the Philippines when the war broke out, was assigned the task of transporting a group of FEAF staff members to Australia and remaining there. Horrified by the disorder he found, Gunn immediately took steps to rectify the situation. Aware that a contingent of fighter pilots had arrived in Australia from the Philippines, Gunn organized them into a new 17th Pursuit Squadron (Provisional), drawing upon the legacy of the original 17th Pursuit unit in the Philippines, with many of the pilots having previously served in that squadron.
Once the 17 fighters were assembled, Gunn led them north to Darwin in his personal Beechcraft transport. Unfortunately, two P-40s were lost to accidents during the journey northward. Despite the pilots’ hopes of returning to assist their comrades in Bataan, upon reaching Darwin, they were informed that their destination was Java instead.
Upon arrival in Java, only six out of the 39 P-40s remained operational when the 17th Pursuit was instructed to hand over their remaining aircraft to the Dutch and prepare for evacuation to Australia. However, the Dutch never managed to put the P-40s into service, as they were destroyed by a Japanese strafing attack shortly after the Americans departed. Additionally, a significant number of P-40s were lost when the ships transporting them to Java were sunk before reaching their destination.
Amidst the early turmoil of the war, one notable success for the Allies was the remarkable number of Japanese aircraft downed by Chennault’s American Volunteer Group (AVG) in China, earning them the legendary moniker of the Flying Tigers.
Prior to engaging the Japanese, Chennault, renowned as one of the world’s most skilled fighter pilots, subjected the AVG pilots to rigorous training. He imparted tactics developed from his understanding of Japanese capabilities and strategies. On December 20, 1941, the AVG sprang into action, intercepting a formation of Japanese bombers en route to Kunming and disrupting their attack. Three days later, additional AVG P-40s inflicted heavy losses on Japanese aircraft assaulting Rangoon.
Recognizing the P-40s’ limitations, Chennault instructed his pilots to exploit the aircraft’s superior diving and level-flight speeds. Employing hit-and-run tactics in two-ship formations proved pivotal to the AVG’s success. Understanding that engaging the Japanese on their terms would likely result in defeat, the American pilots adopted a strategic approach.
Despite their valiant efforts, the AVG faced daunting odds as Japanese forces gained ground in Burma and China. With the United States officially entering the conflict, the War Department devised plans to integrate the AVG into the Army Air Corps, envisioning them as the core of an air force in China.
The loss of the carrier Langley, carrying a cargo of P-40s, along with other significant casualties in Java, diminished the Far East Air Forces to fewer than 100 fighters.
The majority of AVG pilots had different plans, however, and only a few agreed to stay in China with the U.S. Army. Some preferred to maintain their civilian status as pilots for China National Airways, a civilian airline associated with Pan American. Many of the AVG pilots had backgrounds in the Navy or Marine Corps and wished to return to their former services, while some of the former Army pilots harbored resentment toward the new Tenth Air Force structure in India and wanted no part of it. The AVG contracts were set to expire on July 4, 1942, and during this time, the pilots continued to fly and fight as civilian contractors.
The War Department had plans to establish a complete pursuit group in China. This new group was designated as the 23rd Fighter Group (the pursuit designation was changed to fighter in mid-1942), with Colonel Robert L. Scott appointed as the commander. A few former AVG pilots, along with additional mechanics and support personnel, chose to join the 23rd, and they and their P-40s would play a significant role in the Allied air effort in China. The P-40 would remain the primary fighter in the CBI until 1944.
Following the defeat in Java, the Far East Air Forces in Australia began bolstering their forces to oppose the Japanese. Despite over 300 P-40s arriving in Australia by the end of March, heavy losses occurred, especially when the carrier Langley was sunk while transporting a load of P-40s to Java, followed by the abandonment of another shipment carried aboard the freighter Sea Witch. This reduced their numbers to less than 100. The 49th Fighter Group arrived in early February, but its pilots were not deemed ready for combat.
With the Allies’ defeat in Java, Japanese air forces in the Netherlands East Indies posed a threat to Australia’s northern coastal cities. Darwin came under frequent air attacks, prompting the P-40-equipped 49th Fighter Group to be deployed there for defense, while the 8th and 35th Groups, equipped with Bell P-39s and P-400s, were tasked with defending Papua, New Guinea. The P-400 was an export version of the P-39 originally built for the British.
In Australia, young fighter pilots familiarized themselves with the P-40’s capabilities and shortcomings, using this knowledge effectively against the Japanese, much like the AVG in China. The effectiveness of the P-40s was highlighted on August 23, 1942, when pilots from the 49th Group shot down 15 Japanese bombers and fighters. Between April and August, the 49th Group shot down over 60 Japanese planes, gaining air superiority over Darwin. Captain Andrew Reynolds of the 9th Fighter Squadron emerged as the top-scoring Far East Air Forces ace at the time, with 10 enemy airplanes to his credit. With Darwin secure, the 49th Fighter Group moved north to New Guinea, where they began replacing their P-40s with twin-engine Lockheed P-38s by the end of the year.
Due to a shortage of American pilots, several Royal Australian Air Force fighter squadrons were equipped with P-40s, which they nicknamed Kittyhawks. The Australian fighter pilots, motivated by their role in defending their homeland from Japanese aggression, demonstrated courage and resourcefulness. The P-40 proved to be vastly superior to their locally produced Commonwealth Wirraway aircraft.
While British Hawker Hurricanes and Supermarine Spitfires were eventually dispatched to Australia, the P-40 emerged as the primary fighter aircraft for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Australian-operated P-40s played a pivotal role in the Battle of Milne Bay, a crucial engagement that thwarted Japanese plans to seize Port Moresby. Positioned at the Milne Bay airfield, RAAF P-40 squadrons launched assaults on the Japanese landing forces using bombs and machine-gun fire. Australian units continued to utilize P-40s extensively throughout the later stages of the war.
Originally designed for export, the Warhawk aircraft found service under different designations, such as Tomahawks or Kittyhawks, depending on the variant, within the British forces. RAF Kittyhawks and Tomahawks were primarily deployed with the Desert Air Force in North Africa. As the Hurricanes and Spitfires of the RAF excelled in interceptor roles, their P-40 counterparts were predominantly employed in ground support missions. In late summer of 1942, U.S. Army Air Forces introduced P-40s to the Mediterranean theater with the 57th Fighter Group, initially undergoing training alongside the RAF in Palestine before engaging in combat during the Battle of El Alamein under the Ninth Air Force. Additionally, the 79th and 324th Fighter Groups operated P-40s within the Ninth Air Force.
In September 1942, the 33rd Fighter Group received orders for deployment to North Africa under the Twelfth Air Force, just two months before the scheduled commencement of Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of French North Africa. To expedite their deployment, the group’s P-40s were loaded onto the escort carrier USS Chenango. On November 10, as Lt. Col. William W. Momyer led his group off the carrier, news reached them that the airfield at Port Lyautey had been secured.
However, the aircraft deliveries encountered significant setbacks. One P-40 crashed into the sea, another disappeared into a fog bank, and 17 suffered damage during landing accidents. Despite nearly a year passing since the Philippine disaster, inexperienced American pilots still struggled with landing the P-40. Consequently, none of the 33rd Group’s P-40s participated in the initial stages of the invasion. The landing mishaps prompted a halt to further aircraft launches, with the remaining 77 Warhawks remaining aboard the carrier until two days later.
Palm Sunday Massacre
Off the coast of Morocco, an additional 35 airplanes arrived aboard the British carrier Archer to bolster the 33rd Group. Unfortunately, four of these aircraft were lost due to inexperienced pilots mishandling them during landing. Engaged in the North African Campaign, the 33rd Group faced intense action and suffered significant losses, prompting its relief by February 1943. Meanwhile, the 325th Fighter Group, originally slated for deployment to the Ninth Air Force in the Middle East, was redirected to the Twelfth Air Force and reached North Africa in February.
A remarkable event unfolded during the North African Campaign on April 18, 1943, when four squadrons of P-40s from the 57th and 324th Fighter Groups, escorted by Spitfires, intercepted a large formation of German transports returning from an aerial resupply mission for the Afrika Korps in Tunisia. Despite the transports flying close to the sea, the P-40s detected them and launched an attack, which became known as the Palm Sunday Massacre. The P-40s claimed to have shot down 100 tri-motored Junkers Ju-52 transport planes and 16 of their escorts. However, Allied losses included six P-40s and a single Spitfire from the top cover.
The following day witnessed the continuation of the action, resulting in the downing of 12 more transports. This successful interception effectively put an end to German attempts to resupply and reinforce the Afrika Korps in North Africa, accelerating its eventual surrender to the superior Allied forces.
Following the successful defense of Darwin, the Fifth Air Force’s P-40s were redeployed north to New Guinea, where they assumed the ground attack role. They complemented the converted Douglas A-20 Havoc gunships and P-39s, which had borne the brunt of the low-altitude attack role in New Guinea in mid-1942. Similarly, ground target attacks were a significant mission for the P-40s of the China Air Task Force, the forward element of the Tenth Air Force under Chennault’s command in China. The CATF transitioned into the Fourteenth Air Force in the spring of 1943.
In the spring of 1944, the Allies launched an offensive in the CBI theater as British Brigadier Orde Wingate’s Chindit force prepared to penetrate Japanese defenses in Burma. Simultaneously, the Japanese launched an offensive into India’s Arakam Valley, where many of the Allied air bases were situated. The emergency caused by the Japanese offensive prompted the movement of several American air units from the Mediterranean to India, including the 33rd and 81st Fighter Groups. The 33rd was already equipped with P-40s, and the 81st was equipped with them upon its arrival in the CBI. Eventually, both groups relocated to China and joined the Fourteenth Air Force.
By 1944, more advanced fighters, such as the P-38 Lightning, P-47 Thunderbolt, and the North American P-51 Mustang, were becoming increasingly available. As these aircraft became operational, they gradually replaced the older P-39s and P-40s in the seasoned American squadrons. Consequently, as American squadrons transitioned to the new aircraft, their surplus P-40s were often transferred to Allied squadrons operating in the same theaters. This redistribution included several squadrons of the Royal Australian and Royal New Zealand Air Forces, which received P-40s as American squadrons shifted to P-38s in the Southwest Pacific.
By 1945, the role of the P-40 had diminished; however, veterans of the Pacific War recognized that without them, it would have been improbable for the Allies to withstand the Japanese onslaught during the challenging early stages of the conflict.
